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What Is Design Knowledge?

How do designers move from believing, or assuming, to knowing in the course
of action? In industrial design this move involves using theories under different
ontology from different domains, and bridging them is an act that is
epistemologically uncertain.

Ulrik Lie
Norwegian University of
Technology and Science

The article discusses the nature of design knowledge, starting from a literature study
and a model of the minimum knowledge needed for designing. Practising designers
need to justify their assumptions in a large number of ways in order to arrive at a
solution. If this amalgam of justificatory arguments is to be taken up by researchers
in design methodology it poses significant challenges.
Notably, the warrants employed by designers are seldom globally valid. Furthermore,
designers use, and must use scientific, ethic, epistemic and social warrants. There
are many conceptual scientific problems associated with employing so many
different types of knowledge. One problem is that of combining theories under
different epistemology, another is that of combining ethical knowledge with
epistemological knowledge.
If the design process can be understood as a set of heuristics, then design
methodology research will have great problems making usable all-encompassing
models. If the purpose of design methodology is to make theories that are relevant to
design practitioners, then testing and grounding heuristics may be the right
place to start.
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ABSTRACT

How do designers move from believing, or assuming, to knowing in the course of action?
In industrial design this move involves using theories under different ontology from
different domains, and bridging them is an act that is epistemologically uncertain.
The article discusses the nature of design knowledge, starting from a literature study and a
model of the minimum knowledge needed for designing. Practising designers need to
justify their assumptions in a large number of ways in order to arrive at a solution. If this
amalgam of justificatory arguments is to be taken up by researchers in design
methodology it poses significant challenges.
Notably, the warrants employed by designers are seldom globally valid. Furthermore,
designers use, and must use scientific, ethic, epistemic and social warrants. There are
many conceptual scientific problems associated with employing so many different types of
knowledge. One problem is that of combining theories under different epistemology,
another is that of combining ethical knowledge with epistemological knowledge.
If the design process can be understood as a set of heuristics, then design methodology
research will have great problems making usable all-encompassing models. If the purpose
of design methodology is to make theories that are relevant to design practitioners, then
testing and grounding heuristics may be the right place to start.
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INTRODUCTION

What is design knowledge? A common perspective on engineering design and industrial
design is that they are learning processes, yet little is known about how knowledge
actually is formed in design projects, and even less on how designers verify the theories
they form during a project.
This article discusses theoretical underpinnings of knowledge creation in projects. Its point
of departure is the following problem statement: How do designers move from assuming to
believing in the course of action?
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PURPOSE AND METHOD

The nature of knowledge in design is, or should be, central to most researchers in design
methodology. This article is written to clarify the nature of knowledge in design and point to
some consequences for design methodology.
The method employed rests on two concepts. The first is a selective literature study. The
second is a model of the minimum knowledge required in design activity. This serves as a
base to deduce the internal consistency of practicing designers’ knowledge base. A
framework of designers’ justificatory tools and its consequences for design research is
presented and discussed.
Since knowledge and theories are open notations, the terms in the article are defined as
follows:
• Industrial design: To manipulate technology and/or material in order to enhance,
help or modify human behaviour.
• Knowledge: A justified belief
• Warrant: The justificatory argument
• Theory: Beliefs and knowledge
1
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KNOWLEDGE IN DESIGN

A large number of researchers have written about knowledge in design. But much focus
has been put on meta-theoretical or politicized aspects of knowledge:
• The absence of a commonly accepted theory-base for research into design has led
to frequent searches for valid ways to produce knowledge for design in a scholarly
sense [1]. The discussions about research through, for or into design are an
example of this. The issue here has not been how to enforce the designer’s
knowledge, but how to assure the validity of research findings and the design
researcher’s knowledge.
• Investigations and classifications of knowledge in design have often had political
motives – notably to demarcate the professions of design and their educational
disciplines against competing fields. Such texts are important for the development
of a profession, but at the same time they are myth-creating and not suitable for
understanding the profession [2].
• The complex nature of design has led many researchers to embrace Polanyi’s [3]
and later Nonaka and Takeuchi’s [4] notions of tacit knowledge. Although
understanding tacit knowledge is important, it can also be counterproductive. It can
obscure the search for an applicable framework on knowledge in design.
Investigations from HCI [5] have raised arguments for understanding all knowledge
as tacit knowledge, and to understand explicit knowledge as information. Such a
stance would open up discussions on the information medium’s role in the
exchange and appropriation of knowledge. For professions where sketching and
metaphors are central, this is a promising path.
Since the topic of this article is how designers form knowledge, not how others form
knowledge of design, the perspective is narrowed down to the following authors, who have
provided seminal work on forming knowledge in a practical setting, although their
perspective and methodical approach vary:
Donald Schön’s “The reflective practitioner” [6], is a work that challenges a model where
knowledge is created only under a regime of technical rationality. Instead, it emphasizes
how insights are gained also through practical endeavours and how solutions are verified
on a local level. Schön uses the terms reflection-in-action and knowing-in-action on the
situational created knowledge. The implications of Schön’s theories are, among others, a
stronger focus on the values, purposes and norms of designing, as these lay the
foundations for the result of the process. In addition, Schön emphasises that dialoguing
with the situation is a necessary way of working, in contrast to merely apply scientifically
grounded knowledge.
Louis L. Bucciarelli has published two books based on ethnographic studies in engineering
[7] [8]. One of his main points is that the tools and notations that engineers use are socially
constructed and not deduced from natural sciences. If the formerly stated assumptions
that explicit knowledge is in fact information, and Schön’s more loosely described notions
of dialogue with the situation holds, then this theory is important. If knowledge depends on
the medium in which it is conveyed then knowledge in design is also socially constructed
and limited through the mediums of information that the profession use.
Jon Lang has established a framework for understanding behavioural science in
architecture [9] which is an important analogy for artefact design. Lang classifies
knowledge in procedural and substantive theories, which both can be classified as either
positive or normative theories. Lang shows that the many different behavioural theories
that ground design work are conjectural, but nevertheless necessary and useful.
Mario Bunge presents a framework that is analogous to Lang, although his primary interest
is the philosophy of technology [10]. Bunge tries to classify the differences in knowledge
between “applied technological pursuits” and “pure science”. Bunge points out that anyone
occupied with the creation and use of artefacts uses technological theories, which can
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have a different grounding than scientific theories. He divides them into substantive
theories, which he sees as applications of scientific theories, and operative theories, which
he sees as those concerned with the operations of man.
The conclusion from studying these authors is twofold:
1) Designers need at least two types of knowledge in their work: substantive theory of
phenomena and operative theories on how to perform their tasks and solve their
problems. This distinction is important to designers because it signifies knowledge
as truth and knowledge as action. Whereas substantive beliefs can be verified
through science and research, i.e. epistemology, this is not true of operative
theories, which must be verified through ethical considerations. The demarcation
between ethics and epistemology is the principle of ought-implies-can. This holds
that a person ought to perform an action only if that person can perform that action.
This implies that although designers have to bridge their beliefs with their actions,
they are not the same. Knowledge of action must always adhere to what can be
done, while knowledge of truth ranges much wider.
2) Although there is a distinct difference in the types of knowledge involved in design,
the process of designing seems rather fluent when described by Schön. In fact, the
human characteristic of employing heuristics makes the conceptual leap between
different knowledge types seem rather effortless.
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WHAT IS THE MINIMUM KNOWLEDGE NEEDED FOR PERFORMING DESIGN?

In order to discuss these topics further, it may be useful to ask “what is the minimum
knowledge needed when designing?” as opposed to mapping the entire design field.
As the definition states, industrial design is at least about two things. It is about
manipulating and enhancing.
Manipulating technology is not a random process. It may be intuitive and sometimes
coincidental, but it is guided by a mental and physical framework or, if you like, paradigm.
Manipulating technology is in itself a normative activity because one seeks to find the best
or most appropriate solution to a set of needs or desires. In addition, the activity of
manipulation has the purpose of enhancing human behaviour. This means one must
evaluate the effects of the anticipated or the physical result against humans.
A preliminary definition of design knowledge can thus be: 1. Normative knowledge of how
to specify artefacts, and 2. Knowledge of how to evaluate artefacts.
The observant reader will see that this definition encounters two philosophical problems.
One is that in evaluating products one must select the data deemed important and valid;
the second is that normative statements can never be applied from description alone. Both
activities need a warrant for justification. This means we need to dig deeper if we want to
find a coherent framework of design knowledge.
What then, is the minimum knowledge required when designing? For evaluating purposes
we need at least:
1) a theory of what the artefact will be like,
2) a theory of what the life world is like and
3) a theory of response and impact between the two.
In order to give normative statements we need:
4) a purpose, which inherently gives us the metrics we work by,
5) a theory of possibilities and
6) a theory of constraints
It is not possible to perform design activities without these six theories. There might be
more theories, or knowledge, needed, but for sure not less. Since the notions of theories
might be abstract, it might be easier to think of them as
1) The modelled artefact,
3

2) The world and the humans in it,
3) The interaction between the two previous,
4) Design intention, specifications and anything else that states what one wishes to make,
5) Creativity and imagination and
6) The solutions and sub-solutions that are known not to be feasible.
Bridging all these theories, or knowledge if you like, is at best problematic, at worst
impossible. And more important, this is not only a philosophical problem; Think of any
evaluation of non-quantifiable properties in products. Is it possible for a group of designers
to disagree unless the participants hold different theories on how the artefact will be in the
world?
In fact, when evaluating any artefact, the designer must use a set of non-commensurable
theories. This is often referred to as finding a balance between art and science, and
sometimes explained by notions of tacit knowledge. Be that as it may, anyone can see that
producing a theory of an artefact, reducing theories of the world in an appropriate manner,
while at the same time validating theories on impact and response is an extensive task. It
is no surprise that people turn to notions of skill, art or tacit knowledge. In fact, these
problems are not easily reconciled anywhere. There is no help to turn to established
disciplines like philosophy or statistics. No universal tool for comparing theories under
different ontology exists.
The theories needed for normative statements, which precede the solutions in design, are
easier to reconcile. They are guided by purpose, which means we at least have a
framework of rules under which to work. This does not mean that design has to obey
certain laws, only that we have a framework where we can know that some beliefs are
better than others.
The problem in finding the best prescriptive statements when designing is that of making a
theory of possibilities. A theory of possibilities carries an infinite set of solutions. One can
never know if there exists a better solution to your purpose. Constraints are easier; we
have learned the hard way that they don’t work.
The acts of evaluation and prescription are both integral parts of designing. Simply put, it is
just not possible to evade one type of knowledge, or theory, in the design process. That
does not mean that designers do not emphasize one or more types more than others. But
some sort of theory is needed on all accounts. Bridging these theories is the next step, and
this bridging of knowledge is what is usually referred to as “the design process”, when it is
performed in an iterative fashion. The design process is mysterious to many, as it involves
creativity and unforeseen solutions. But the activities of purpose, analysis, synthesis and
evaluation are not especially difficult to combine in practice. This means in practice that
the designer performs a transparent process, but on a shaky ground. He can never
reconcile and justify all the beliefs he need to perform the design.
This leads us to the conclusion that the sort of knowledge needed in design can never be
the same knowledge as is sought for in philosophy or science. A non-definition of this
could be: “Industrial design is the act of bridging the obscurant with the infinite in a
mannerist way.” This may humour us, but not help us.
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THE JUSTIFICATION OF DESIGN THEORIES

As design theories have differing natures and span different ontological domains, all
design theories cannot be justified in the same manner. They must be justified in their own
domain.
4

For example, a theory of how the product interacts with the user must be substantiated
through social knowledge. A theory of the mechanical properties of the product is
substantiated through the use of empirically tested knowledge. Theories on social norms
and limitations are verified through experience, and theories on the interaction between
the product and the world are substantiated and justified through the information mediums
the organization use and believe in. And so on.
How are these theories justified, or: to which extent are they justified? In order to model
this, a framework is necessary. This article introduces a framework based on the notions
type, level and range of warrants.
5.1 Types of warrants
In the textbook The Craft of Research, Booth et al. [11] operate with 6 types of the most
common warrants:
1. Warrants based on empirical evidence
2. Warrants based on authority
3. Warrants drawn from prior systems of knowledge and belief
4. General cultural warrants
5. Methodological warrants
6. Articles of faith
These warrants should be fairly self-explanatory. And although this framework is intended
for research, they serve the purpose of illustrating the many ways in which the designer
can ground the theories during a practical project. The rhetorical question is here: Which
warrant is most frequently used by designers? The answer is all of them. And it is possible
that even more warrants are employed in design projects. That designers use many types
of warrants in their work is an obvious fact.
5.2 Levels of warrants
The notion level of warrants refers to the fact that knowledge is not only personal, but also
intra-personal. In the book Profession, Tradition och Tyst Kunskap [12], which is a critical
reread of Polanyi, Bertil Rolf has proposed a threefold framework of knowledge. The
division between knowledge levels depends on how the rules warranting knowledge is
controlled. Skill is the knowledge that follows rules controlled by the individual itself. KnowHow follows rules that are established by a social context outside the individual. Expertise
is know-how with an ability to change the rules.
The important point here is the distinction between personal and intra-personal knowledge.
The designer’s skills form an important part of the design ability. When the designer is
given a task, he will perform them in a way he thinks is optimal, adhering to what he
perceives as his own strong and weak skills and his values. The assumptions about
design are thus verified on a personal level.
The result of that process is, on the other hand, verified in a social context. But humans
take part in many social relations, so the issue is also, which social context that verifies the
designer’s beliefs. Nominally, at least, the business organization for which the designer
works should contain the set of values and appreciative system for verification. But the
designer also has a self-understanding as a member of a profession, so the disciplinary
values in that profession also form an important appreciative system. In addition, the
designer may see himself as cool, urban, member of a religious society, strongly
nationalist etc. All of these societal contexts will provide appreciative systems important for
the verification of design assumptions.
5.3 Range of warrants
The range of warrants is also important to understand design knowledge. For instance, we
know from experience that colour palettes in products vary across nations even though the
product function is similar. These differences can be explained in many ways. The
hypotheses based on light focuses on the light intensity in that nation, and states that
5

colour intensity will be more appreciated by the consumer depending on the proximity to
equator. The hypotheses based on culture states that colour appreciation will be
dependant on cultural factors only. Either way, a warrant for a product aspect such as the
use of colour use in design will be locally valid only. The range of a warrant is restricted by
geographical boundaries.
The range of design warrants poses a great problem for design researchers. What are the
limits to the theories that are grounded in design projects, and to what extent can these
theories be applied in other projects?
An interesting fact is that the engineer will be capable of using warrants from universally
accepted systems of knowledge (science), whereas a product stylist must use cultural
warrants of locally valid acceptance. This opens up for a conflict in design projects and the
conflict can often be rooted in different emphasis of theories and different ways of verifying
those theories.
5.4 Ethical warrants
The former warrants all concerned themselves with traditional epistemology. But the
division between ethics and epistemology is also important to designers. This division is
expressed through the statement ought-implies-can. This holds that for a statement about
an activity to be true, the person in question must have the ability to perform that activity. If
the person cannot perform that activity, then the statement is not true. Ethical warrants are
important in design on the following ground: The difference between what we can imagine
and what we can do. The tension between these two is underlying all design activity. What
separates an idea from an artefact is that the idea at some point was perceived by the
designer as feasible to produce. This means that since design always involves uncertainty,
the warrant that allows the designers to commence his endeavour is always an ethical
one.
5.5 What are the consequences for design research?
The design warrants can not be, as some like to think, results of a clear scientific process.
Design warrants are an amalgam of different ways of reasoning. They are based on
cultural factors, personal experiences and societal acceptance. The types of warrants
range from those that can be challenged through knowledge systems to those that depend
on articles of faith. The level of warrants can be either personal and tacit or intra-personal
and thereby open to formulation. The range of a warrant can only be decided through
empirical knowledge, which means that testing and erring probably are necessary in
designing.
For researchers into design that wish to investigate how the design process can be
improved and to facilitate grounded knowledge for use in design activity, this poses
considerable problems. Design encompasses so many knowledge types that it is hard to
see that they can be reconciled in a singular research area that is similar to Kuhn’s normal
science.
The biggest challenge when developing design research into a more coherent research
field is the problem with generalizing warrants so that they are universally applicable
across the entire design field. Since design activity is so dependant on individual
constraints and possibilities, this poses a serious problem.
The researcher must choose whether to work small, separate areas of the design field or
to make a model of the design process where it is reduced to such a degree that it bears
no resemblance to the actual process.
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PERFORMING DESIGN PROJECTS

What is the picture in a real project then? How do designers go about to test their theories
in practice?
In order to fulfil a design project, designers must establish or acquire many theories on
which they base their decisions. These theories are more ore less true, but at least they
6

are supposed to be effective for solving the tasks and sub-tasks involved in realising an
artefact. Three theoretical problems are prominent when the designer performs the design
project:
Understanding the design task is first of all an ontological problem. The perception and
selection of which product aspects to prioritize is dependant on the designer’s appreciative
system, and which aspects he or she chooses to give rank. The outcome of the process is
dependant on the designer’s values and the way the design process is organized. Not
because there is a direct link between process and product, but because the organisation
of the design project will influence the aspects that are taken into consideration during
development.
Generating product solutions and sub-solutions is a prescriptional activity where personal,
organisational and societal norms interfere. The evaluation of solutions and sub-solutions
are based on the goals of the design project, the artefact’s most important properties and
the perceived possibilities. But the warrants used for evaluation can be differing both in
type, level and range. The trade-off and evaluation is therefore highly dependant of the
competence of the design team in choosing the right issues, and also the values preceding
those choices.
7

ETHICS – NEGLECTED, BUT STILL IMPORTANT

This article has sought to present some theoretical issues in understanding how designers
form and justify knowledge in projects. One of the consequences for design research is
that it seems very difficult to establish design methodology as a generic and near-scientific
discipline.
At the heart of design activity is prioritizing and giving rank to one aspect over another.
This can be done in a tacit, implicit or sub-conscious way, but it is always done. Regarding
the epistemology of design, designers employ competing, non-comparable warrants. This
means that both the understanding of design problems and the performance of a design
project is highly dependant of the paradigm in which they are performed and the values of
the designers.
When designers move from assumptions to knowledge, this move is based on the effects
of the results from the process, rather than from epistemic considerations in the course of
actions. Design knowledge can therefore be considered as a set of design heuristics.
Heuristics, on the other hand, is prone to false inductions and personal biases. Design
methodology can serve a role in testing and grounding those heuristics.
If the design field is understood as a set of heuristics, then the implications for design
methodology is that it must be understood as and allowed to be conjectural and based in
empirical practical problems.
For the area of design methodology, a self-understanding as an ethical discipline could be
very promising. A number of methodologies now come in the form of process-trees and
diagrams. These have great problems in gaining acceptance among practitioners. If
design activity is so facetted as this article has indicated, then maybe the ethics, values
and principles underlying those methods are the real contribution in a discipline of design.
If design principles could be disclosed and communicated as ethical models rather than
near-scientific ones, this could prove fruitful for the design community.
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